

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 049347 TOSEC 060028

FOR COVEY ONLY

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR

SUBJECT: TESTIMONY BEFORE THE HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
COMMITTEE, MARCH 4, 1976

1. MR. CHAIRMAN, MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE:

I AM HAPPY TO BE HERE TO TALK WITH THIS COMMITTEE. THE

MAJOR PART OF MY PREPARED REMARKS IS DEVOTED TO MY

FEBRUARY TRIP TO LATIN AMERICA, BUT I AM ALSO PREPARED

TO DISCUSS THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS AND OVERALL

US-SOVIET RELATIONS IN THE LIGHT OF MY JANUARY TRIP TO

MOSCOW; AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE LEGISLATION, WITH

PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO LEGISLATIVE RESTRICTIONS ON ARMS
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TRANSFERS TO TURKEY AND THE SITUATION IN CYPRUS.

2. (SECTION ON LATIN AMERICA: ARA AND

S/P HAVE SECRETARY'S COMMENTS AND ARE STARTING FROM
SCRATCH. NEW DRAFT WILL BE CABLED TO YOU MONDAY AFTER-
NOON.

3. (UNDERLINE) U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS

BEFORE MY TRIP TO LATIN AMERICA, I VISITED MOSCOW IN
JANUARY, WHERE I HAD EXTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS WITH GENERAL
SECRETARY BREZHNEV AND FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO ON
STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION. WHILE I WILL ADDRESS THE MORE
SENSITIVE ASPECTS OF SALT IN EXECUTIVE SESSION, I WOULD
LIKE TO MAKE SOME GENERAL REMARKS NOW.

4. OUR STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS ARE GUIDED BY
THE KNOWLEDGE THAT GENERAL NUCLEAR WAR WOULD BE A CATAS-
TROPHE FROM WHICH OUR CIVILIZATION WOULD NEVER RECOVER,
AND THAT BOTH SIDES LONG AGO PASSED THE POINT OF
DIMINISHING RETURNS FOR ADDITIONAL INCREMENTS OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS. THE PRESENT ROUGH STRATEGIC PARITY BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION, AND THE OVERALL
IMPROVEMENT IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS IN RECENT YEARS,

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OFFER THE OPPORTUNITY TO IMPOSE MEANINGFUL LIMITS ON OUR
RESPECTIVE NUCLEAR ARSENALS.

5. AT VLADIVOSTOK IN DECEMBER 1974, THE PRESIDENT AND
GENERAL SECRETARY BREZHNEV AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO
PUT A CAP ON STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IN DOING SO,
THE SOVIETS ACCEPTED EQUAL AGGREGATE LIMITS FOR BOTH SIDES
ON STRATEGIC LAUNCHING VEHICLES, AND AGREED TO DEFER THE

ISSUES OF U.S. FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS IN EUROPE AND THE
NUCLEAR FORCES OF THIRD COUNTRIES.

6. IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS, TO IMPLEMENT THE VLADIVOSTOK
AGREEMENTS, WE HAVE SOUGHT TO DEVISE FORMULAS TO GOVERN
ICBM'S, SLBM'S AND HEAVY BOMBERS, AND TO DEFINE THE
SYSTEMS LIMITED, IN PARTICULAR, WHAT WOULD CONSTITUTE A
HEAVY MISSILE.

7. THE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE BEEN MADE MORE COMPLEX BY TWO
NEW WEAPONS SYSTEMS. THE FIRST OF THESE IS THE NEW SOVIET
BOMBER WHICH WE CALL THE BACKFIRE. ALTHOUGH THE BACKFIRE
APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN DESIGNED FOR PERIPHERAL -- OR
THEATER -- MISSIONS, UNDER SOME PROFILES IT APPEARS TO
HAVE THE CAPABILITY OF REACHING THE UNITED STATES.

THEREFORE, WE HAVE BEEN SEEKING TO ENCOMPASS THE BACKFIRE
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IN THE AGREEMENT. THE OTHER IS THE CRUISE MISSILE.
CRUISE MISSILES PREVIOUSLY DEVELOPED BY BOTH SIDES HAVE
BEEN LARGE, SLOW-MOVING, CUMBERSOME AND INACCURATE.
BUT TECHNOLOGY NOW OFFERS THE PROSPECT OF HIGH ACCURACY
AND RELATIVELY SMALL SIZE. THE PROBLEM IS TO CONSTRAIN
CRUISE MISSILE SYSTEMS WITHIN PRUDENT YET USEFUL LIMITS,
AND TO FORESTALL A NEW COMPETITION WHICH COULD LEAD TO
CRUISE MISSILE DEPLOYMENT IN EVERY CONCEIVABLE MODE AND
GUISE.

8. THE EFFORTS TO IMPLEMENT THE VLADIVOSTOK ACCORD HAVE
MEANT A YEAR OF MEETINGS IN GENEVA BY THE DELEGATIONS OF
BOTH SIDES. IN ADDITION, I HAVE MET ON OCCASION WITH

FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO, AND IN JANUARY WITH GENERAL SECRETARY BREZHNEV. AN AGREEMENT IS STILL NOT IN HAND, BUT WE WILL CONTINUE TO STRIVE FOR AN AGREEMENT WHICH PROTECTS OUR SECURITY INTERESTS AND GIVES US STRATEGIC STABILITY.

9. MEANWHILE, THE CONGRESS NOW HAS BEFORE IT A DEFENSE BUDGET WHICH CALLS FOR MODEST INCREASES IN OUR STRATEGIC SPENDING. WE BELIEVE THAT A STRONG DEFENSE IS ESSENTIAL
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BOTH FOR OUR SECURITY AND FOR OUR NEGOTIATING POSITION.

10. FOR THEIR PART, THE SOVIETS ARE CLEARLY INTERESTED IN REACHING A SALT AGREEMENT. AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, THEY PRESENTLY APPEAR EMBARKED UPON A COURSE WHICH RAISES THE MOST SERIOUS QUESTIONS FOR US.

11. I AM REFERRING, OF COURSE, TO THE PATTERN OF BEHAVIOR EXEMPLIFIED BY MASSIVE SOVIET AND CUBAN INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA.

12. THE PROGRESS WE MADE IN MOSCOW ON SALT ISSUES WAS NOT MATCHED ON THE ANGOLA ISSUE AND WHAT IT MIGHT PORTEND FOR THE FUTURE. TO THE CONTRARY, THE SOVIET POSITION, BOTH PUBLIC AND PRIVATE, IS THAT ANGOLAN DEVELOPMENTS SHOULD BE KEPT ISOLATED FROM OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS.

13. GENERAL SECRETARY BREZHNEV'S ADDRESS TO THE 25TH SOVIET PARTY CONGRESS, WHICH OPENED LAST WEEK IN MOSCOW, CLEARLY SET FORTH THIS TWO-TRACK SOVIET POLICY. THE GENERAL SECRETARY REITERATED INTEREST IN ACHIEVING

A SALT AGREEMENT, AND IN IMPROVING ALL ASPECTS OF OUR
BILATERAL RELATIONS. BUT AT THE SAME TIME, HE REAFFIRMED
SOVIET SUPPORT FOR SO-CALLED "NATIONAL LIBERATION
STRUGGLES," AND STATED FLATLY THAT "DETENTE DOES NOT IN
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THE SLIGHTEST WAY ABOLISH, AND CANNOT ABOLISH OR CHANGE,
THE LAWS OF THE CLASS STRUGGLE."

14. THIS IDEOLOGICAL COMMITMENT, FORMULATION OF POLICY,
OR STATEMENT OF INTENT -- HOWEVER IT IS DEFINED -- IS
BEING MATCHED BY THE DEVELOPMENT OF CAPABILITIES TO SUP-
PORT IT. THE SOVIET UNION HAS EMERGED AS THE SECOND
SUPERPOWER, NOT ONLY IN STRATEGIC ARMAMENTS, BUT ALSO
IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES, AND THE
ABILITY TO PROJECT SOVIET INFLUENCE ON A GLOBAL SCALE.

15. THE USE OF THESE CAPABILITIES TO SEEK UNILATERAL
ADVANTAGES IN INTERNATIONAL TROUBLE SPOTS, INEVITABLY
AFFECTS THE OVERALL COURSE OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS.
WE MUST BE PREPARED WHERE NECESSARY TO PURSUE COURSES
OF ACTION THAT WILL EFFECTIVELY COUNTER SOVIET ANGOLA-
TYPE INTERVENTIONS. A CHANGE IN BEHAVIOR WILL NOT COME
AUTOMATICALLY, CERTAINLY NOT AS LONG AS LACK OF RESTRAINT
IS ALLOWED TO GO UNCHALLENGED AND ASSERTIVE BEHAVIOR
REWARDED WITH SUCCESS.

16. DESPITE CURRENT DIFFICULTIES, IT REMAINS IN OUR
INTEREST TO ENGAGE THE SOVIETS IN CERTAIN ENDEAVORS
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WHICH SEEK A MUTUAL REDUCTION OF TENSIONS AND WHICH
PROMISE TO HELP MODERATE SOVIET CONDUCT OVER TIME:
-- WE WILL PERSEVERE IN NEGOTIATIONS TO EASE THE EAST-
WEST MILITARY CONFRONTATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND,
PARTICULARLY, TO REDRESS THE IMBALANCE BETWEEN NATO AND
WARSAW PACT GROUND FORCES. OUR POSITION IN THESE TALKS
HAS ALWAYS BEEN ARRIVED AT JOINTLY WITH OUR NATO ALLIES
AND WE WILL CONTINUE TO COOPERATE CLOSELY WITH THEM IN
ADVANCING OUR PROPOSALS AND IN RESPONDING TO SOVIET
INITIATIVES.

-- WE WILL SEEK TO ASSURE THAT THE PROVISIONS OF THE
HELSINKI CONFERENCE'S FINAL ACT ARE FULLY IMPLEMENTED
AND CONTRIBUTE NOT ONLY TO AN EASING OF TENSION IN
EUROPE, BUT ALSO ENHANCE HUMAN RIGHTS AND
FOSTER MORE NORMAL RELATIONSHIPS.

17. OUR ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION ARE
LIMITED BY THE REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED IN TITLE IV OF THE
TRADE ACT. NEVERTHELESS, US COMMERCIAL RELATIONS WITH
THE USSR CONTINUED TO EXPAND IN 1975, DUE LARGELY TO
GRAIN SALES. OUR TRADE SURPLUS WITH THE SOVIET UNION IN
1975 WAS MORE THAN \$1.5 BILLION, AND IT ACCOUNTED FOR
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ABOUT 14 PERCENT OF OUR GLOBAL SURPLUS.

18. IN SUM, THERE ARE FAVORABLE PROSPECTS IN OUR
RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND WE WOULD LIKE TO
DEVELOP THEM FURTHER. BUT THIS DEPENDS IN LARGE MEASURE

ON WHETHER THE SOVIETS USE NATIONAL POWER IN A RESPONSIBLE MANNER, AND THIS IN TURN DEPENDS PARTLY ON OUR OWN RESOURCEFULNESS, RESOLVE, AND DETERMINATION TO ACT IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR OWN NATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES AND INTERESTS.

19. (UNDERLINE) SECURITY ASSISTANCE

MR. CHAIRMAN, TURNING NOW TO THE AREA OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE, I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS MY ADMIRATION FOR YOUR SKILL IN MANAGING THE HIGHLY COMPLEX BILL THAT IS NOW BEFORE THE HOUSE. AS YOU KNOW, THE ADMINISTRATION HAS HAD DIFFICULTIES WITH CERTAIN PORTIONS OF THIS LEGISLATION, BUT WE ARE GRATEFUL FOR THE COMMITTEE'S MANIFEST EFFORT TO PROVIDE US WITH THE FUNDS NEEDED FOR OUR GLOBAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM. THE FULL FUNDING OF OUR MIDDLE EAST REQUEST IS ESPECIALLY GRATIFYING IN VIEW OF ITS IMPORTANCE TO OUR CURRENT CONFIDENTIAL

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EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A JUST AND DURABLE PEACE SETTLEMENT IN THIS REGION.

20. I AM ALSO PLEASED BY THE COMMITTEE'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE PROBLEMS THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN ENCOUNTERED IF THE AUTOMATIC SANCTION PROVISIONS HAD NOT BEEN REMOVED FROM THE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION AMENDMENT. THE PRESENT LANGUAGE PROCLAIMS THE MUTUALLY-SHARED OPPOSITION OF THE CONGRESS AND ADMINISTRATION TO ANY DISCRIMINATORY ACTIONS, BUT AT THE SAME TIME ALLOWS US THE FLEXIBILITY

TO DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH PARTICULAR CASES.

21. THE ADMINISTRATION CONTINUES TO BE CONCERNED WITH THE MANY PROVISIONS IN BOTH THE HOUSE AND SENATE BILLS WHICH REQUIRE CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF CAREFULLY REACHED EXECUTIVE BRANCH DECISIONS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SPECIFIC PROGRAMS ALREADY AUTHORIZED BY LAW. WE AGREE THAT POTENTIALLY CONTROVERSIAL OR OTHERWISE SIGNIFICANT DECISIONS SHOULD BE REACHED ONLY AFTER APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL CONSULTATION. HOWEVER, THE PENDING LEGISLATION WOULD IN PRACTICE IMPOSE DELAYS ON VITAL ACTIONS, EVEN IF THERE ARE NO CONGRESSIONAL OBJECTIONS. WE ARE ALSO TROUBLED BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS

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OF THE PROPOSED CONCURRENT RESOLUTIONS IN THIS CONNECTION. NEVERTHELESS, WE HOPE THE LEGISLATION WILL BE ENACTED.

22. TURKEY AND CYPRUS (UNDERLINED)

I WOULD LIKE TO TURN BRIEFLY TO ANOTHER ISSUE THAT CONCERNS US ALL A GREAT DEAL. AS YOU KNOW, THE U.S. IS CURRENTLY DISCUSSING WITH TURKEY THE TERMS OF A NEW DEFENSE COOPERATION AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD PERMIT THE RESUMPTION OF OPERATIONS AT OUR JOINT INTELLIGENCE FACILITIES IN TURKEY. THE UNITED STATES AND THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE HAVE IMPORTANT SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN, WHICH INVOLVE THE MAINTENANCE OF OUR ALLIANCE RELATIONSHIP WITH TURKEY, AND THE USE OF JOINT FACILITIES IN THAT COUNTRY.

23. WE BELIEVE THAT WE MUST NOT LET OUR VITAL INTERESTS
IN THAT PART OF THE WORLD BECOME HOSTAGE TO THE INHERENTLY
UNSTABLE DAY-TO-DAY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CYPRUS SITUATION
OR THE UNPREDICTABLE PACE AND COURSE OF CYPRUS NEGOTIA-
TIONS WHICH WE CANNOT CONTROL. THE RESTRICTIONS PLACED
ON BOTH FMS CREDIT AND SALES AND ON GRANT ASSISTANCE IN
BOTH THE SENATE AND HIRC VERSIONS OF THE FY 76 SECURITY
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ASSISTANCE BILL HAVE RAISED IN THE MINDS OF TURKISH
LEADERS SERIOUS QUESTIONS ABOUT THE VIABILITY OF THEIR
ALLIANCE AND MILITARY SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP WITH THE
UNITED STATES. WE BELIEVE THAT OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH
TURKEY MUST BE PRESERVED AND THAT THE REMAINING RESTRIC-
TIONS ON ASSISTANCE TO TURKEY SHOULD BE REMOVED AS SOON
AS POSSIBLE.

24. WE ALSO RECOGNIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF RESOLVING THE
CYPRUS DISPUTE WHICH HAS FOR SO MANY YEARS POISONED
THE ATMOSPHERE IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AND RELATIONS
BETWEEN OUR NATO ALLIES, GREECE AND TURKEY. AFTER MY
MEETINGS WITH THE GREEK AND TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTERS IN
BRUSSELS ON DECEMBER 12, THE TWO MINISTERS MET AND
AGREED TO SUPPORT THE EARLY RESUMPTION OF THE CYPRUS
INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS. AT THE TALKS WHICH RESUMED IN
VIENNA FEBRUARY 17-21 THE TWO SIDES AGREED TO EXCHANGE
PROPOSALS IN NICOSIA WITHIN SIX WEEKS ON A TERRITORIAL
SETTLEMENT AND THEN UNDERTAKE FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS IN

VIENNA IN MAY.

25. EVENTS OF THE PAST YEAR HAVE SHATTERED THE ILLUSION

THAT RESTRICTIONS ON MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO TURKEY WILL
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FORCE CONCESSIONS FROM THE TURKS. ON THE CONTRARY,

IN OUR JUDGMENT TURKEY WILL BE MORE FLEXIBLE IN ITS

NEGOTIATING POSTURE ONCE OUR MILITARY SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP,

AND OUR TRADITIONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH ANKARA, HAVE BEEN

RESTORED. INGERSOLL

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